Domino Marketing Plan
Domino’s Pizza Marketing Plan I. Executive Summary Domino’s Pizza’s strong financial performance during 2006 and into 2007 has given the company a significant amount of flexibility and freedom given the increased revenues and earnings in defining its strategies for the future. For continued growth however Dominos has to reduce customer churn, drive up same-store sales, continually reinforce and strengthen their brand, capitalize on the sociocultural shifts occurring in the United States and elsewhere, and finally continually redefine its in-store dining strategies relative to the growing rise of online sales.
What is remarkable about Domino’s approach to marketing is the 14. 6% same-store growth the company has achieved from 2001 – 2005 according to JP Morgan (2006). This is nothing short of phenomenonal. Lesser competitors have higher in-store and same-store sales than Domino’s, and also have a broader mix of lunch and dinner alternatives. In addition, according to Roper (2005) 58% of American households are willing to try a new dinner alternative relative to cooking or ordering out.
Compounding this is the fact that 73% or 3 out of every four households by 4:30pm have not decided what will be served for dinner according to JP Morgan (2006). These two insightful figures provide a glimpse into how volatile the quick-service restaurants (QSR) marketplace is. Clearly the use of up-sell, cross-sell and incentives to drive up same-store sales is critical in this market, as is the continual growth and focus on the brand globally, finally with a focus on innovation. These are the three most critical marketing strategies for Domino’s today. II. Situation Analysis
Today Domino’s is the leader in the delivery segment of pizza sales in the U. S. , second only to Pizza Hut in total pizza sales, as this competitor has 4,000 Red Roof restaurants with over 100-person seating capacity. Domino’s strength in delivery is evidenced by the fact that the company delivers an average of one million pizzas a day and has the greatest market share of the delivery business at 19. 4% at the close of 2005 according to JP Morgan (2006). As of the close of 2006, the company is selling nearly 1 million pizzas a day between domestic and international operations according to JP
Morgan (2006). This delivery-only approach allows Domino’s to focus its marketing and operations strategies on delivery only, without the distractions and potential struggles of a dine-in business, as is the case for Pizza Hut. According to many industry analysts and experts and also by reviewing Domino’s financials and low asset investments and exposure to long-term debt through ration analysis (see Appendix I for ratio analysis) the delivery-only business is the best area in which to operate within the $33 billion pizza market.
Approximately $12 billion of the pizza category’s sales are through delivery, and according to Roper (2005) delivery will continue to gain share in the category as lifestyle trends continually place more and more of an emphasis on time and convenience, and using pizza delivery to overcome the highly hectic times from 4:30pm to 6pm on weeknights. This has also been validated through research completed by Domino’s Market Research (2005). Figure 2 illustrates how the change in families and lifestyles in general provide a favorable backdrop for the pizza delivery business.
Figure 2: The shifting mix of pizza sales favor delivery With the growing amount of last-minute dinner decisions, pizza delivery is a timely and convenient option that gives families a viable meal replacement option for an affordable price. As daily lives become more hectic and people are less inclined to cook, shop, and clean, we would expect this occasion to increase and provide continued demand for pizza delivery III. Product Market Structure
The quick-service restaurant (QSR) pizza category is the second-largest category within the $187 billion QSR sector, with an estimated $33 billion in 2005. The QSR pizza category consists of four components: delivery, dine-in, carryout, and a diminutive drive-thru business. Domino’s operates primarily within the delivery segment of the QSR pizza category. Delivery accounts for 36% of the total U. S. QSR pizza category, with $11. 8 billion in sales for the 12 months ended November 2005. Pizza delivery sales growth in the U. S. was close to flat during that same time frame, although over the ast several years, delivery has grown steadily as a percentage of the pizza category, to 36% of the pizza category sales in 2005 from 29% in 1997 according to NPD (2005) shown in Figure 3. Figure 3: Industry-wide pizza delivery choices by consumers IV. The External Environment The following sections of this marketing plan review industry analysis, competitive pressures, factors leading to economic growth and stability, sociocultural trends, the customers’ environment, and the internal organizational climate. Industry Analysis
Throughout the last five years, Domino’s has outperformed both Pizza Hut and Papa John’s in same-store sales growth. In the most recent surveys from Roper (2006) and JP Morgan (2006) there is clear evidence that Domino’s same store-sales will rebound significantly against by Papa John’s highly effective uses of promotion and new products. 2007’s competitive challenge is to re-invigorate same-store sales and become the industry leader once again. Papa John’s sales out performance has been driven by an improved and consistent delivery-focused marketing message, as well as strong new and limited-time-only products.
Domino’s stressing Cheesy Bread, the Philly Cheese Steak pizza, and last year’s 5-5-5 promotion have all contributed to greater in-store sales yet the company is still struggling relative to competitors. Despite a strong presence in a very competitive category, Domino’s most pressing marketing challenge is to retain same-store sales leadership. The company has been extremely consistent in achieving at least some degree of same-store sales growth each year, an achievement that its peers cannot claim.
Domino’s has had 12 consecutive years of flat or positive same-store sales growth. The most recent 7-7-7 promotion is anticipated to be just as success as 5-5-5 based on the feedback of franchise advisory council members. Porters’ Five Forces Model of Competition applied to Domino’s The five forces that comprise Dr. Porter’s model are industry competitors, pressure for substitute products, bargaining power of suppliers, bargaining power of buyers, and the influence of potential entrants.
Diagram 1 shows the Porter Five Forces Model graphically. Each of these areas is now discussed in bullet form in the following series of sections. Assessing Domino’s Industry Competitors • Highly fragmented series of competitors throughout all nations Dominos competes in makes branding consistency and product quality critical. • Strongest global competitor is Pizza Hut. • Significant churn in the smaller mom-and-pop independent shops. Pressure from Substitute Products Significant competition from QSR concepts that include both lunch and dinner, and also have a steady stream of new products and services. • Focus on QSR entrees that are easily delivered by drivers is the major substitute competitive threat. • Instant dinner products in many food stores is also forcing a significant emphasis on innovation over simply relying on price as the competitive strength. Bargaining Power of Buyers • Dominos’ buyers demand innovation in the form of both new menu and food items but also in the definition of new pizza concepts.
Pizza Hut has been slow to innovate on certain product areas and as a result has faced pressure from buyers as they seek out competitor’s newer pizza and dinner offerings. • Domino’s customers demand regional variation and quality. Their most loyal customers are less concerned with price and more concerned with consistent quality and taste. • Domino’s customers are less price-sensitive than the majority of pizza purchasers As a result the customer base has significant influence on future product direction. Bargaining Power of Suppliers Highly dependent on the very volatile commodity of cheese and its price. The price of cheese has a direct impact on the company’s broader profitability. • Domino’s has yet to fully vertically integrate into cheese production, yet has moved aggressively into dough and distribution facilities to gain greater control over their supply chain • Highly dependent on the price of other dairy and cheese products as well, as innovation in this industry centers on how to re-define entirely new product concepts based on cheeses.
Potential Entrants • Apart from Pizza Hut and Papa Johns at a national level, Domino’s has no chain-based competitors today of any size in the United States today. • Secondary competitors include the smaller chains of ten stores or more stores that comprise 40% of the total U. S. pizza market. Competitive Pressures Most Prevalent in Advertising Advertising as a Competitive Weapon Domino’s has the second-largest advertising budget in the pizza category behind Pizza Hut.
Although Domino’s advertising budget is lower than Pizza Hut’s in the aggregate, the company can narrow its focus on promoting its delivery business. Almost every Domino’s Pizza commercial features a delivery driver, and its slogan, “Get the Door, Its Domino’s,” has helped create a top-of-mind awareness that has made the Domino’s brand synonymous with pizza delivery. Recently, the company has been at the forefront of alternative media strategies that use various Internet promotions as well as product placements in movies such as In Good Company and television shows like The Apprentice.
The pizza QSR category is very advertising driven in general, and any additional media weight can be pivotal given that approximately 85% of transactions include an advertised deal, promotion, or coupon according to Roper (2005 and JP Morgan (2006). Franchisees from Domino’s agree with an advertising shift toward national media once again because of the impressive 4. 6% same-store sales growth that it helped generate at franchised stores from 2001 – 2005. Although franchisees are given the option to spend less on local advertising to offset the national increase, the company expects many franchisees to continue prior local marketing levels.
Domino’s sees much higher advertising effectiveness from national media buys versus local media, as the former are 40% more efficient than local media buys, and that national television reaches 20% more of its target customers than local television. Pizza Hut, Domino’s most dominant global competitor, was clearly way behind all three national pizza chains in 2006, with a very weak innovation story on new products to sell, and more re-shuffling of menu items with aggressive pricing and programs to bring in the lucrative in-store buyer.
The net result from this lack of innovation was Pizza Hut losing significant market share. It’s expected that Pizza Hut will be more competitive to be more promotional throughout 2006, and would expect aggressive advertising that accentuates a “value” message. Economic Growth and Stability Critical to the economic growth and stability of Domino’s is the predictable revenue stream from franchisees, which continues to have above average rates of return for franchisees. The ROI for any given franchisee hovers in the 40% range based on an annual sales volume of $650,000.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of franchisees across the United States. Figure 4: Distribution of Domino’s franchisees throughout the US A true competitive strength, franchisees for Domino’s are one of the most potent competitive advantages the company has. The majority of franchise owners come up through the franchise system, have an average length of relationship with Domino’s for 9 years or more. A sure sign of franchisee loyalty is the 99% contract renewal Domino’s is able to generate year over year, and the fact that 98% of the stores purchase all their ingredients and food products from Domino’s Corporate.
There is also a 99% royalty and distribution receivables rate across all franchisees and less than an 8% attrition rate of franchisees globally. Figure 5 provides for an analysis of the dynamics of franchise store ownership. Figure 5: Dynamics of store ownership The Customer Environment Pizza sales are by far most common during the dinner day-part, consisting of more than 53% of Domino’s sales. Late night is a pretty significant piece of the business at 13. 8%, and could continue to be an opportunity in the category. Figure 6 from the Domino’s Annual Report shows the distribution of pizza sales by day part.
Figure 6: Analyzing Pizza Sales by Hour of Day To counter this trend of dinner being by far the most critical time for any pizza delivery business, Domino’s competitors are experimenting with food products to move into other meals. Breakfast is not sold at most pizza operators; however, Papa John’s is in the process of testing breakfast pizzas such as “pizza omelets. ” Interestingly, pizza sales also tend to be skewed toward weekends, when customers order pizzas not only as a meal replacement but also for special occasions.
Weekday sales may also present an opportunity for pizza operators as the demands on people’s time increase and a greater premium is placed on the convenience of ordering pizza on a weeknight. During the week, sales should increasingly benefit from busy households that, when returning home from a long day of work would rather order a pizza than cook and clean. Figure 7 provides an analysis of how Domino’s management sees the opportunity for delivering pizza and other entrees adaptable to home delivery.
Figure 7: Domino’s Value Pyramid Demographically, consumers within the 15- to 34-year-old range are the most pizza-friendly. Based on the 2000 Census, trends in population demographics imply a steady increase in the percentage of people within this age range in the United States. V. SWOT Analysis Strengths Strong and well-diversified franchise system Domino’s has developed a large, profitable, and committed franchise organization that is a critical component of its system-wide success and leading position in pizza delivery.
In addition, Domino’s shares 50% of the pre-tax profits generated by its regional dough manufacturing and distribution centers with those domestic franchisees who agree to purchase all of their food from the company’s distribution system. These arrangements strengthen Domino’s ties with its franchisees by enhancing their profitability while providing the company with a continuing source of revenues and earnings. This arrangement also provides incentives for franchisees to work closely to reduce costs.
The strong, mutually beneficial franchisee relationships are evidenced by the over 98% voluntary participation in Domino’s domestic distribution system, over 99% domestic franchise contract renewal rate and over 99% collection rate on domestic franchise royalty and domestic distribution receivables. Top pizza delivery-company in the US with a leading international presence Domino’s is the number one pizza delivery company in the US with a 19. 5% market share based on reported consumer spending as of the close of 2006.
With 62% of the global 7156 stores located in the all the states in the US, the domestic store delivery areas cover a majority of US households. The company’s share position and scale allow it to leverage its purchasing power, distribution strength and advertising investment across its franchisees. Outside the US, the company has significant share positions in the key markets in which it competes, including, among other countries, Mexico (where it is the largest quick service restaurant (QSR) company in terms of store count in any QSR category), the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan.
Dominos’ has a leading presence in most of these international markets as well. Global brand awareness The Domino’s Pizza brand is one of the most widely-recognized consumer brands in the world and its unique value propositions are instantly recognizable through the series of one-line positioning statements the company relies on for quick name recognition. Consumers associate this brand with the timely delivery of quality, affordable pizza and complementary side items. The Domino’s Pizza brand has been routinely named a MegaBrand by Advertising Age.
Domino’s continues to reinforce this brand with extensive advertising through television, radio and print over the past five years, the company’s domestic franchise and company-owned stores have invested an estimated $1. 3 billion on national, local and co-operative advertising in the US. The company also enhances the strength of its brand through marketing affiliations with brands such as Coca-Cola and NASCAR. For 2006, advertising was increased 25%, from 4% to 5% of Sales dedicated to this strategy.
Approximately 94% of pizza consumers in the US are estimated to be aware of the Domino’s Pizza brand. The brand is particularly strong among pizza consumers for whom dinner is a fairly spontaneous event, which industry research indicates to be the case in nearly 50% of pizza dining occasions. In these situations, service and product quality are the consumers’ priorities, the epitome of Domino’s existence. Weaknesses Dropping Revenue per employee For full financial ratio analysis of Domino’s please see Appendix I.
Domino’s revenue per employee is considerably lower than the industry average in the US. Comparing the revenue per employee of its competitors such as Wendy’s ($3. 7 million) and Yum Brands ($1. 6 million), the closest competitors of Domino’s, the company derives much lower revenues per employees. Lower revenues per employee signify lower productivity for the company as compared to its competitors and the need for more effective use of operations and service programs to get higher levels of productivity from each employee. Over-reliance on US
Domino’s is striving to be a global company yet has strong ties in both company culture and operational performance to the US. In 2005 the company generated less than 10% of total sales from international markets, with US markets comprising the bulk of sales and profits. The US consumer spending is also expected to face a downturn in the light of rising interest rates and fluctuating inflation. Consumer spending accounts for about two-thirds of all economic activities in US, implying its influential role in shaping up US economy.
Any material impact on consumer spending can affect the economy and thus businesses directly. For a company like Domino’s, consumer spending is a very important factor that may affect the business of the company. This reliance on a single market, which faces the threat of declining consumer spending, has increased the company’s risk profile. Opportunities Domino’s plans to continue to promote its successful advertising campaign “Get the Door. It’s Domino’s”, through national, local and co-operative media.
Beginning in 2005 and continuing to today, each of the domestic stores increased its contributions to the advertising fund for national advertising from 3% to 4% of retail sales. The company intends to leverage its strong brand by continuing to introduce innovative, consumer-tested and profitable new pizza varieties (such as Domino’s Philly Cheese Steak Pizza and Domino’s Doublemelt Pizza) and complementary side items (such as buffalo wings, cheesy bread, Domino’s Buffalo Chicken Kickers and Cinna Stix) as well as through marketing affiliations with brands such as Coca-Cola and NASCAR.
The focus throughout all these activities is to drive up same-store revenues and increasingly put pressure on Papa John’s Pizza recent increase in performance on this key metric. Expansion and optimization of domestic store base The company plans to continue expanding its base of domestic stores to take advantage of the attractive growth opportunities in US pizza delivery. The scale of operation allows Domino’s to expand its franchisee base without adding significantly to infrastructure costs.
Additionally, the franchise-oriented business model allows expanding the store base with little if any capital investment, as franchisees pays for their own fixed assets. International business expansion Pizza’s global appeal has on the one hand been a central focus for Domino’s yet on the other has continually frustrated their attempts to move into the global markets more aggressively and with stronger results. Domino’s continues to built a broad international platform, almost through its master franchise model, as evidenced by the nearly 2,900 international stores in more than 50 countries.
These international stores have produced positive quarterly same store sales growth for 44 consecutive quarters. Threats Challenged by rapid cheese cost fluctuations Back in 2004, cheese prices skyrocketed to an all-time high, with Domino’s paying an average of $1. 64 per pound for cheese that year. The company’s gross margins fell by 70 percent, in part due to the higher cost for cheese. The forecasting of cheese prices is capricious and difficult, and yet it is the one single commodity that is critical to the success of Domino’s long-term.
The swings in the popularity of low-carb diets also have impacted the company’s ability to sell given the high cheese content of their pizzas and food items. Increasing retail rental rates Domino’s ability to expand also is dependent on retail locations and their prices as well. In areas where real estate is at a premium, the costs of starting up a new Domino’s are astronomical. The investment required for a new retail location in a large metro area is typically at rents 4% to 6% above what a comparable suburban or rural location can be created from.
Focus towards health consciousness Over the past few years the focus on low carb diets and healthy eating has continually impacted the sales of fast food products, Books and now movies extolling the evils of fast food are also having a direct effect on the sales of food by QSR outlets. Consumers are showing increased preference for fat-free and healthy food products. Food items containing trans-fat are losing market share as they are linked to cardiovascular diseases. This could impact the revenues of the company.
Market saturation By most analysts’ and experts’ forecasts, the US fast food market is close to saturation. This translates into the need for highly unique value propositions, new product introductions every year that grab the attention of the consumer who is open to trying new foods for dinner, and a focus on quality to ensure customer satisfaction with the new products. Between 2004 and 2008, the US fast food market is expected to increase in value by only 1. 7% to reach approximately US$153. billion. Thus, the potential growth for fast-food chains like Domino’s’ does not seem too high. Marketing Plan VI. Marketing Goals and Objectives The following marketing goals and objectives that Domino’s needs to accomplish in 2007 to continue its market leadership: 1. Aggressively drive up same-store sales by 30% through the aggressive use of national advertising and the bundling of pizza and dessert offerings including drinks. 2. Minimize customer churn by 15% through loyalty programs. . Grow web-based ordering by 15% through the use of coupons and specials available only on the web. VII. Marketing Strategies a. Primary Target Market The primary target market for Domino’s Pizza is the hectic household, with a per capita income of $46,000 a year in major metro areas with populations of 1 million or more. This market is further differentiated in that it contains or more children under 18, and the majority of evenings there is confusion and little thought to what is for dinner.
This fits with the statistic of 73% of households do not know what they will have for dinner at 4:30pm every evening. b. Marketing Mix i. Product Definition: A pizza large enough to feed a family of four with several alterative toppings included and a series of vegetarian, beef, chicken or seafood combinations as well. [pic] The following is a perceptual map that shows the relationship of Domino’s relative to other brands in the competitive arena. i. Pricing: Competitively priced with high enough margins for the franchisees to make some margin as well. iii. Promotion: The Family Meal Replacement Strategy starts with the 7-7-7 strategy as defined in earlier parts of this plan, including a focus on the areas of core programming around bundling to reduce customer churn. iv. Place: Primarily a delivery product, this will be a meal served in thirty minutes or less. VIII. Marketing Implementation |Drive up same-store sales by 30%|Minimize customer churn by 15% |Grow web-based ordering by 15% | |Product | | | | |Easy-to-deliver highly nutritious meal | | | | | |X | | | |“finger food” for watching a DVD at home| | | | |(orderable over the Web) |X | |X | | | | | | |Deep fried cinnamon buns for dessert | | | | | | | | | |Sandwiches for lunch by ordering out | | | | | |X |X (as a essert ad-on) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |X | | | |X (office catering) | |X orderable over the web | |Price | | | | |Stay with price positioning that | | | | |connotes value over cheapness |X |X |X | | | | | | |Define price off couponing to drive up | | | | |web ordering | | | | | | | |X | |Loyalty Program | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |X | | |Distribution | | | | |Reward franchisees for selling more | | | | |through the web with greater margin | | |X | | | | | |Focus on repeat purchasers and customer | | | | |lifetime value with price breaks for | | | | |loyalty programs |X |X | | | | | | | |Build franchisee locations to focus on | | | | |reducing customer churn through personal| | | | |service | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |X |X | | |Promotion or IMC | | | | | | | | | |Extensive use of bundling and focus on |X |X | | |promotions for most loyal customers | | | | | | | | | |Define national ads to reward best | | | | |customers | | | | |X |X | | |National ad to launch web-only | | | | |sandwiches and light catering for | | | | |offices with a give-away of a Mini |X | |X | |Cooper | | | | | | | | | IX. Budgets In order to accomplish the three marketing objectives mentioned, two major investments need to be made, and they are a customer lifetime value tracking system, and also an accentuated web ordering system for capturing light catering orders that will be the center of the future go-to-market strategies for moving up-market into businesses. Cost Components |Customer Lifetime value tracking |Web ordering system for light catering | |Application Development |$120,000 |$320,000 | |Professional Services |$260,000 |$640,000 | |Total Costs |$380,000 |$960,000 | |Applications (%) |31. 5% |33% | • Net Present Value and Sensitivity Analysis For the customer tracking system, assuming a 5% discount rate, a 7 year life of the project, and a cash flow of $1M in the first year, followed by $2M in the second year, $2. 5M in the 3rd year, and $3M in the 4th and 5th year, and $4M in the 6th through 10th years yields a NPV of $1,951,375. The present value of expected cash flows is $2,331,375.
For the Web ordering system for light catering, assuming a 5% discount rate and a 7 year life of the project, and the a cash flow of $1M in the first year, followed by $2M in the second year, $2. 5M in the 3rd year, and $3M in the 4th year, and $4M in the 5th through 10th years yields a NPV of $1,449,727 and a present value of expected cash flows of $2,409,727. • Assumptions The following are the significant assumptions behind the revenue figures: 1. Professional services will be highest on order capture due to the extensive integration required to complete this application development. 2. The highest dollar figure for professional services however comes from order management, which includes the most complex integration tasks. 3.
Definition of the internal development costs include outsourcing the development of internal tools and the acquisition of specific tools for the managing of source code and documentation. X. Evaluation, Control, and Contingency Plans In terms of these systems, the following measures of performance will be used. These metrics capture the extent and level of performance possible when integrations are in place, and reflect the stronger levels of ROI possible: 1. The Perfect Order – Defines the number of catering orders correctly filled every day from a franchisee. 2. Lead escalation ratio – Defines the number of leads that are escalated to the top-performing franchisees.
The focus is on moving leads for light catering to the top-performing members of the channel. 3. Gross Margin per Order – This is a critical link to measure the level of profitability per order. 4. Usage rate by franchisee – This is essential to find out if the designed systems and applications are meeting the needs of the external stakeholders they were specifically developed for. In addition, the following metrics will be used to measure the performance of these strategies over time: 1. Monthly same-store sales analysis by region 2. Gross margin by franchisee region and nation 3. Aided and unaided awareness of the new national advertising programs imed at launching sandwich service through catering to lunch working sessions in companies 4. Focus on lifetime value analysis and assessment through new automated systems that track and highlight those customers who show the greatest potential to turn into lifetime customers. This investment in IT is going to make it possible to find the most loyal customers and target them with special promotions. 5. Number of web orders placed, and margin per web order placed – this is going to be critical for measuring the impact of the new system for placing online orders and getting automated fulfillment. XI. Appendices Appendix I: Domino’s Pizza Ratio Analysis 2001 – 2006 |Dominos Pizza Inc. | | | | | |Profitability Ratios |1/1/2006 |1/2/2005 |12/28/2003 |12/29/2002 |12/30/2001 | | | | | | | | |Return on Equity (%) |-21. 19 |-11. 33 |-5. 44 |-16. 11 |- | |Return on Assets (%) |23. 48 |13. 92 |8. 7 |14. 31 |- | |Return on Investment |31. 58 |21. 31 |14. 56 |22. 3 |- | |Gross Margin |0. 025 |0. 024 |0. 026 |0. 026 |0. 025 | |EBITDA of Revenue (%) |15. 52 |14. 58 |15. 75 |15. 38 |13. 21 | |Operating Margin (%) |13. 17 |11. 85 |11. 96 |12. 38 |10. 1 | |Pre-Tax Margin |11. 46 |6. 92 |4. 68 |7. 54 |15. 69 | |Net Profit Margin (%) |7. 16 |4. 31 |2. 93 |4. 4 |13. 83 | |Effective Tax Rate (%) |37. 5 |37. 75 |37. 48 |37. 11 |11. 9 | | | | | | | | |Liquidity Indicators | | | | | | |Quick Ratio |0. 68 |0. 64 |0. 63 |0. 57 |- | |Current Ratio |1. 02 |1 |0. 99 |0. 4 |- | |Working Capital/Total Assets |0. 01 |0 |0 |-0. 02 |- | | | | | | | | |Debt Management | | | | | | |Current Liabilities/Equity |-0. 43 |-0. 34 |-0. 26 |-0. 42 |- | |Total Debt to Equity |-1. 44 |-1. 42 |-1. 34 |-1. 7 |- | |Long Term Debt to Assets |1. 52 |1. 69 |2. 1 |1. 42 |- | | | | | | | | |Asset Management | | | | | | |Revenues/Total Assets |3. 28 |3. 23 |2. 97 |3. 02 |- | |Revenues/Working Capital |381. 62 |-8,218. 3 |-1,057. 35 |-125. 08 |- | |Interest Coverage |4. 55 |2. 64 |1. 84 |2. 59 |-1. 89 | Appendix I I: Domino’s Pizza Business Segment Analysis 2001 – 2006 |Domino’s Pizza Business Segment Analysis | | | | | | | | | | | | |Total Revenues | | | | |Report Date 1/1/2006 |1/2/2005 |12/28/2003 |12/29/2002 |12/30/2001 | | | | | | | | | Domestic Stores |562,865 |537,488 |519,879 |517,200 |496,384 | | Domestic Distribution |935,461 |902,413 |821,695 |779,684 |796,808 | | International |129,635 |116,983 |96,386 |81,762 |69,995 | | Total |1,627,961 |1,556,884 |1,437,960 |1,378,646 |1,363,187 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |Operating Income | | | | | | | | | | | | Domestic Stores |148,920 |131,518 |127,082 |126,714 |114,253 | | Domestic Distribution |52,959 |46,110 |45,946 |43,155 |38,068 | | International |36,947 |34,079 |28,117 |25,141 |15,162 | | Total |238,826 |211,707 |201,145 |195,010 |167,483 | XII. References Domino’s Market Research (2005) – From the 2005 Analyst Day Presentation Accessed from the Internet on February 22, 2007 from location: http://media. corporate-ir. net/media_files/irol/13/135383/presentations/DPZ_InvDayAll. pdf JP Morgan (2006) – Domino’s Pizza Inc. JP Morgan Consumer & Retail Holiday Conference Presentation. From the Investor’s Section of the Domino’s website. Accessed from the Internet on February 22, 2007 from location: http://library. corporate-ir. net/library/13/135/135383/items/225605/InvestorPresJPMorgan. pdf [pic]
March, 2005 investor presentation given by Domino’s CEO – Downloaded from the Investor’s Section of the website on February 22, 2007 from location:: http://media. corporate-ir. net/media_files/irol/13/135383/presentations/DPz_052506. pdf Roper (2005) – Roper Starch Worldwide Market Research. Bakery and Pizza Goods Market Analysis, 2005. From a press release at Pizza Marketing Quarterly: http://www. pmq. com/industrynews. shtml accessed from the Internet on February 22, 2007. Roper (2006) – Roper Starch Worldwide Market Research. Bakery and Pizza Goods Market Analysis, 2006. From a press release at Pizza Marketing Quarterly: http://www. pmq. com/industrynews. shtml Accessed from the Internet on February 22, 2007. ———————– Diagram 1: Porters’ Five Forces Model