Consequences of the Financial Crisis on the in Peru?S Economy
Consequences of the financial crisis on the in Peru? s Economy Claudia H. Gonzales School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan, P. R. China, 430070 Abstract Peru has shown signs of a slowdown in employment. This situation has increased the number of unemployment rate in Peru. In this scenario it is possible that employment opportunities to grow this 2009? This paper try to show how the crisis can affect the economy and what will be the consequences in the future.
Keywords financial crisis, export, products, slowdown, employment 1 Introduction In the year 2008 the world began to feel the crippling effects of the financial crisis that began in the United States in the summer of 2007. In the face of this crisis there were unusually aggressive actions by governments and central banks to support financial markets, financial institutions and their economies. But despite these efforts the outlook for the global economic growth is the worst since the 1930s. The economy of the United States is at the center of this global financial disaster.
The American housing market meltdown, the credit crunch, the collapse of the “shadow banking sector,” as reflected in derivatives trading, hedge funds and equity markets, have already triggered a year long American recession and a loss of 2. 6 million payroll jobs in 2008. Central banks around the world, including the U. S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of Canada, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England have sharply reduced interest rates to support their economies, as most are clearly in recession. In the United States, its central bank the Federal Reserve cut its target for overnight interest rates to a range of 0% to 0. 5% on December 15th. Japan’s central bank interest rate is also effectively zero. The European Central Bank rate is at 2% and the Bank of England has a 1. 5% policy rate. The Bank of Canada lowered its overnight policy rate to 1% on January 20th. At 1%, Canada’s central bank rate is only slightly higher than the effective zero rates in the U. S. and Japan. But even with these low or zero central bank interest rates virtually everywhere, private interest rates are still quite high and credit availability is still too tight.
There is clear evidence that very low interest rates are not working to expand economic activity. In the current recessionary environment, banks are obviously worried about lending to each other, and of course, are worried about lending to consumers and firms. Bankers also worry that recessions are a bad time to be pushing loans. Interest rates that count, such as, inter-bank lending rates, mortgage lending rates, bank commercial lending rates, are all unusually high especially considering that inflation is also very close to zero.
Even though prime bank lending rates are low, the conditions for loans at those rates have increased. Thus, loan rates look low but banks are lending at much higher rates above their nominal prime rates. 2 . The history of the Peru? s economy Through the nineteenth century and into the mid-twentieth century, the great majority of the Peruvian 1/13 population depended on agriculture and lived in the countryside. By 1876 Lima was the only Peruvian city with over 100,000 people–only 4 percent of the population.
Much of the impetus for economic growth came from primary exports. In common with the rest of Latin America up to the 1930s, Peru maintained an open economic system with little government intervention and few restrictions on either imports or foreign investment. Such investment became highly important in the twentieth century, especially in the extraction of raw materials for export. For many Latin American countries, the impact of falling export prices and curtailed external credit in the Great Depression of the 1930s led to fundamental changes in economic policies.
Many governments began to raise protection against imports in order to stimulate domestic industry and to take more active roles in shaping economic change. But Peru held back from this common move and kept on with a relatively open economy. That put it behind many other countries in post-World War II industrialization and led to increasing pressures for change. Significant protection started in the 1960s, accompanied by both new restrictions on foreign investment and a more active role of government in the economy.
One of the country’s basic problems has been that the growth of population in the twentieth century outran the capability to use labor productively. The ratio of arable land to population– much lower than the average for Latin America–continued decreasing through the 1970s. Employment in the modern manufacturing sector did not grow fast enough to keep up with the growth of the labor force, let alone provide enough opportunities for people moving out of rural poverty to seek urban employment.
The manufacturing sector’s employment as a share of the labor force fell from 13 percent in 1950 to 10 percent in 1990. 3. Orientation Toward Primary Product Exports Peru’s most famous exports have been gold, silver, and guano. Its gold was taken out on a large scale by the Spanish for many years following the conquest and is of little significance now, but silver remains an important export. Guano served as Europe’s most important fertilizer in the mid-nineteenth century and made Peru for a time the largest Latin American exporter to Europe.
The guano boom ran out about 1870, after generating a long period of exceptional economic growth. When the guano boom ended, the economy retreated temporarily but then recovered with two new directions for expansion. One was a new set of primary product exports and the other a turn toward more industrial production for the domestic market. The alternative primary exports that initially replaced guano included silver, cotton, rubber, sugar, and lead. As of 1890, silver provided 33 percent of all export earnings, sugar 28 percent, and cotton, rubber, and wool collectively 37 percent.
Copper became important at the beginning of the twentieth century, followed on a smaller scale by petroleum after 1915. Then, in the post-World War II period, fish meal from anchovies caught off the Peruvian coast became yet another highly valuable primary product export. Industrial products remained notably absent from Peru’s list of exports until the 1970s. As late as 1960, manufactured goods were only 1 percent of total exports. Manufacturing for the home market has had many ups and downs. The first major downturn came with the guano boom of the mid- nineteenth century.
Foreign-exchange earnings from guano exports became so abundant and, therefore, imported goods so cheap that much of Peru’s small-scale local industry went out of production. The end of the guano boom relieved this pressure, and in the 1890s a new factor, a 2/13 prolonged depreciation of the currency, came into play to stimulate manufacturing. The currency was at that time based on silver, and falling world market prices for silver in this period acted to raise both import prices and export values (of products other than silver), relative to Peruvian costs of production.
Without any overt change in national policies, Peru began a process of import-substitution industrialization combined with stronger incentives for exports. Domestic entrepreneurs responded successfully, and the economy began to show promising signs of more diversified and autonomous growth. This redirection of Peruvian development was in turn sidetracked in the 1900-1930 period, in part by a decision to abandon the silver-based currency and adopt the gold standard instead.
The change was intended to make the currency more stable and, in particular, to remove the inflationary effect of depreciation. The change succeeded in making the currency more stable and to some degree in holding down inflation, but Peruvian costs and prices nevertheless rose gradually relative to external prices. That trend hurt exports and the trade balance, especially in the 1920s, but instead of devaluing the currency to correct the country’s weakening competitive position, the government chose to borrow abroad to keep up its value.
As has been noted, many Latin American countries reacted to the Great Depression by imposing extensive import restrictions and by adopting more activist government policies to promote industrialization. But at that point, Peru departed from the common pattern by rejecting the trend toward protection and intervention. After a brief experience with populist-style controls from 1945 to 1948, Peru returned to the open economy model and a basically conservative style of internal economic management, in sharp contrast to the growing emphasis on import substitution and government control in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia.
Aided by the early recovery of some of its main exports in the 1930s, and then by development of new primary exports in the early post-World War II period, Peru had in many respects the most successful economy in Latin America up to the mid-1960s. But increasing pressure on the land from a rapidly growing population, accompanied by rising costs and limited supplies of some of the country’s natural resources, began to intensify demands for change.
One of the worst blows for continued reliance on growth of primary exports was a sudden drop in the fish catch that provided supplies for Peru’s important fish meal exports; over-fishing plus adverse changes in the ocean currents off Peru cut supplies drastically in the early 1970s. That reversal coincided with supply problems in copper mining. Costs had begun to rise steeply in the older mines, and development of new projects required such largescale investment that the foreign companies dominant in copper hesitated to go ahead with them.
Further, population pressure and increasing difficulties in raising output of food converted Peru into an importer for a rising share of its food supply and began to work against use of land for agricultural exports. Although new investment and better agricultural techniques could presumably have helped a great deal, it began to seem likely that the only way to maintain high rates of growth would be to shift the structure of the economy more toward the industrial sector.
Evolution of Foreign Investment During its long period of attachment to an open economic system, Peru welcomed foreign investment and in some periods adopted tax laws specifically designed to encourage it. That is to say, until the 1960s the small fraction of Peruvians in a position to determine the country’s economic policies welcomed foreign investment without paying much attention to growing signs of popular opposition. In 3/13 the 1960s, many things changed.
The major change for foreign investors was that growing criticism of their role in the economy led to nationalization of several of the largest firms and to much more restrictive legislation. Foreign investment played a relatively minor role in the nineteenth century, although it included railroads, British interests in banking and oil, and United States participation in sugar production and exports. Its role grew rapidly in the twentieth century, concentrated especially in export fields.
In 1901, just as Peruvian copper began to gain importance, United States firms entered and began buying up all but the smallest of the country’s copper mines. The International Petroleum Company (IPC), a Canadian subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, established domination of oil production by 1914 through purchase of the restricted rights needed to work the main oil fields. The trend to foreign entry in manufacturing as well as finance and mining was stimulated by promotional legislation under the eleven-year government of Augusto B.
Leguia (1908-1912, 1919-1930), an initially elected president turned dictator who regarded foreign investment as the key to modernization of Peru. That muchpublicized partnership between a repressive government and foreign investors was to play an important role for the future of Peru, by feeding convictions that foreign investment was inescapably linked to control of the country by the few at the expense of the public. By the end of the 1920s, foreign firms accounted for over 60 percent of Peru’s exports.
The Great Depression of the 1930s changed that by bringing new foreign investment to a halt and by driving down the prices of the products of foreign firms (chiefly copper) much further than those exported by Peruvian firms. That double effect brought the share of exports by foreign firms down to about 30 percent by the end of the 1940s. Foreign investment remained low in the first postwar years, both because investors in the industrialized countries were preoccupied at home and because it was not encouraged by the populist government in Peru from 1945 to 1948.
After a military coup installed a conservative dictator in 1948, the government offered a renewed welcome to foreign investors, made particularly effective by the Mining Code of 1950. This law offered very favorable tax provisions and quickly led to an upsurge of new investment. History repeated itself: as in the 1920s, a repressive government turned to foreign investors for economic growth and for its own support, adding fuel to widespread public distrust of foreign firms. Public opposition to foreign ownership focused particularly on the largest firms owning and exporting natural resources, above all in copper and petroleum.
The IPC became the center of increasing conflict over the terms of its operating rights and its financial support of conservative governments. When Fernando Belaunde Terry (1963-1968, 1980-1985) took office as president in 1963, he promised to reopen negotiations over the contract with IPC, but he then delayed the question for years and finally backed away from this promise in 1968. His failure to act provoked the military coup led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975), this time from the left wing. The Velasco government promptly nationalized IPC and started a determined campaign to restrict foreign nvestment. Although the government subsequently moderated its hostility to foreign firms, continuing disputes and then the deterioration of the economy led some companies to withdraw and held foreign investment down to very low levels through the 1980s. The redirection of economic strategy under the Fujimori government in 1990-91 included a return to welcoming conditions for foreign investment, providing a much more favorable legal context, and 4/13 disavowing completely the control-oriented policies of the governments of Juan Velasco Alvarado and Alan Garcia (2005 – actual).
Several foreign oil companies responded immediately, although the disorganized state of the economy and the context of political violence discouraged any general inflow of new foreign investment. 4. Effects of the crisis in the Peruvian Economy 4. 1 Transmission channels Four contagion channels operate to extend the economic shock resulting from the financial crisis, originating in the United States to the rest of the world. : external demand, commodity prices, financial flows and remittances. 4. 1. 1 Decreased demand for Peru’s exports
The decreased demand by Peru’s trading partners reduced trade flows. The magnitude of impact will depend on the degree of Peru’s dependence, directly or indirectly, on, in particular, its three major trading partners, the countries affected by the crisis as the United States and European Union and China respectively. Participation in the Exports by Country and Products, 2008 Group of products Traditional Cooper Gold Others Non traditional Textile Agricultural Chemical Others Total U. S. A 12. 3 2. 7 2. 1 7. 6 6. 1 2. 6 1. 9 0. 2 1. 4 18. 4 E. U 12. 5 6. 4 0. 5 5. 7 4. 0. 6 2. 3 0. 4 1. 1 16. 8 CHINA 11. 3 5. 4 0. 1 5. 9 0. 7 0 0. 1 0 0. 5 12 THE OTHERS WORLD 39. 6 10. 2 15. 2 14. 2 13. 1 3. 3 1. 9 2. 8 5. 2 52. 7 75. 8 24. 6 17. 9 33. 3 24. 2 6. 5 6. 1 3. 3 8. 3 100 Note that Peru’s dependence the United States and the European Union has decreased considerably as a result of the Peru having diversified its exports and of the increasing importance of newly emerging economies. In 2000, the U. S. and the European Union consumed 27. 7% and 21. 4% of Peru’s exports, respectively. Today, each consumes 18. 4% and 16. 8%, respectively.
Evolution of the volume indicator of global demand (Var. %) 5/13 United States European Union Worl d Jan-06 Jul-06 Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Lower external demand resulted in both smaller others and more cancellations to Peru’s export oriented industries. They also affect the flow of tourist, the number of there is down, and the spends and the average stay. In turn, the decrease in Peruvian exports reduces economic and employment growth, while also leading to the deterioration of current account deficit and creating pressure on its exchange rate.
A look at our exports in recent months showed a contraction in external demand. In terms of volumes, the export of non-traditional products were the most affected mainly textiles and chemicals. Evolution of the exports of products non traditional Export of agricultural products (Var % per year) Export of fishing products (Var % per year) Export of textile products (Var % per year) Export of chemical products (Var % per year) 4. 1. 2 Remittances The importance of income from remittances has been increasing as a result of increased the number of /13 migrants and economic growth in host countries has seen remittances grow significantly. According to Central Bank statistics, income from remittances totaled $ 2,437 million in 2008, registering a growth of 14. 4% compared to 2007 and its share in GDP over from 1. 3% in 2000 to 1. 9% in 2008. According to the survey of Public Opinion to Receivers of Remittances in Peru, dating from 2005, about 10% of adults in Peru receives remittances from abroad, forming an important component of disposable income and therefore consumption.
Evolution of Workers’ Remittances 1990 -2008 %GDP Source : BCR Migrant workers, especially those in industries most affected by rising unemployment, notably, such as, the service industries and construction, have dramatically reduced their remittances. In addition, stricter restrictions on foreign labor by host countries has reduced Peruvians’ ability to work abroad, which decreases remittances yet further. In recent months, remittances fell significantly. While in the first quarter of 2008 growth was 20. 1% in the fourth quarter of last year growth was only 2. %. 4. 1. 3 Deterioration of Commodity Prices The terms of trade have always played a critical role in the evolution of the Peru’s economic cycles. Falling prices of raw materials significantly affects the prices of Peru’s main export products, specifically those in the mining sector (copper, zinc, tin, lead, molybdenum, among others). The drastic fall in international prices directly affects the income of exporters and sectors related to this sector.. In addition, affecting the external sector, the decreased income mining results in a decline in tax revenue.
Lower revenue, threatens long-term fiscal sustainability, as well as constraining fiscal policy, which should be closely linked to the magnitude and duration of the international crisis and its effect on income. 4. 1. 4 Contraction of capital flows In the context of globalization, uncertainty, the perception of high risk and the pursuit of security has led 7/13 to international investors and lenders to sharply reduce foreign investment and external loans to the private and public sectors, especially in developing economies.
Such decrease in foreign capital results in a shortage of foreign credit, lower levels of foreign direct investment, and capital outflows, due to foreign investors withdrawing from in Peru’s capital markets. To liquidate their assets, foreign investors provide capital outflow from the country, which together with the current account deficit, upward pressure on exchange rate, affecting the fit of the balance sheets of businesses and individuals’ income in soles and debts in dollars, as well as banks. Recent months, revealed significant short-term and long-term capital outflows from Peru.
At the end of the fourth quarter of 2008, the net flow of short-term capital was negative U. S. $ 2, 213 million, as foreign banks withdrew their investments from short-term in soles and in dollars, in part, to overcome a huge amount of CDBCRP acquired by non-residents in the reevaluated period. Net flow of short-term capital (Millions in US$) Quarterly Annual Source: BCRP, Projections MEF The Foreign direct investment recorded a negative value of $ 1,113 million in the fourth quarter of 2008, while foreign investment in domestic bonds and equities showed a small inflow of U.
S. $ 23 million. Long-term loans decreased in the fourth quarter of 2007, but increased from the previous quarter, amounting to U. S. $ 801 million. The largest credit ratings in international capital markets, limits the availability of funds for credit lines to companies and financial system for the corporate sector with direct access to international banks. Such limited sources of external financing limits the availability of domestic credit, raising investment costs, which, in turn, reduces economic growth. eads to a strong set of domestic credit conditions, affecting the cost of financing, and therefore the potential for growth, especially in the developing world economies, such as Peru. the emerging world which is part of Latin America. In Peru, the impact on the credit have become relative weaker, the product of prudent macroeconomic policy and the prudent banking regulations applied in previous years, as well as appropriate management of the expectations through the timely implementation of the Economic Stimulus Plan and monetary management by the BCRP.
Thus, the financial and banking system continue to make credit available despite the foreign capital outflows in the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009. 8/13 The credits of the financial system grew in late December 2008 and March 15, 2009 compared to September of last year and were in all sectors and both soles and dollars. Credits in foreign currencies continue to rise, while in dollars, while they grew up to March 15, on an annual basis there is a slight deceleration: 38. 5% compared with growth of 41. 8% and 39. 7% June and September respectively.
Increases in commercial loans, mortgages and small business loans, but the case of consumer credit, indicates a significant slowdown. The growth rate of these loans fell from 34. 5% in September 2008 to 21. 3% at March 15, a result of both the more restricted access to credit cards and their more unfavorable terms of credit. 5. Employment growth in Peru In recent months, employment growth in Peru has slowed. as reflected by national indicators from the Ministry of Labor. Employment in December reached 6. 9% and 5. 2% in January, in December 138,300 people were formally employed and in January, fell to 131,600.
In February showed a strong decrease of -2. 3%, where only 128,600 people had suitable employment, as shown in figure 1. Figure 1 Urban Peru: evolution of the monitory index monthly in companies with 10 and more workers, January 2007 – February 2009 Note: the information is about the first day of each month Source: Ministry of Labor – DNPEFP Elaboration: MTPE – Programa de Estadistica y Estudios Laborales (PEEL) The latter decline was due to the contraction in employment in the extractive sectors (-6. 6%), services (3. 1%), manufacturing (-2. %), industry, transport, storage and communication (– 0. 4%) and trade (0. 3%). In the first quarter, in Lima, employment in manufacturing fell by 4% over the last quarter of 2008, alone. According to the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI), October to December last year, this sector employs a 691,600 people, but in the first quarter of 2009 fell to 663,900. This means that 26,700 workers lost their jobs. The figure would increase in the country, as there is a greater percentage of the population engaged in exports. In addition to this, the contraction of 2. 1% in the mining and hydrocarbons sector, which resulted in the reduction of jobs. According to the federation of mining 8,000 workers are dismissed by the crisis, while 9/13 the Ministry of labor, said that the number of redundancies in this sector amounts to 5,000, a figure that matches with the figures given by the National Society Mining, Petroleum and Energy. A decrease in Peru’s economic growth and employment begins to reflect the impact of the external crisis. The impact of the external crisis is beginning to be reflected in employment in Peru.
Exports of agricultural products, textiles, fisheries and chemicals have experienced a sharp decline of -20%. 5. 1 Employment in decline Peru was one of the countries that would better withstand the international financial crisis, and hence employment. The International Monetary Fund projected economic growth of 7%; Cepal, 5% and the World Bank 5. 2%. GDP (Gross Domestic Product) measures the output of a country. And if there is more production, more labor intensive and, therefore, there are more employment opportunities. Conversely, if production is low, there is little chance of getting a job.
Thus the impact of the external crisis is beginning to be reflected in employment in Peru. Exports of agricultural products, textiles, fisheries and chemicals have a strong data shows a fall of -20%. In the beginning of this year, the government projected an economic growth of 5%. The Ministry of Labor estimated to achieve this goal Peru would need to create 435,800 new jobs. But according to several analysts, the employment rate continues to decrease, because if the economy continued to fall in the latest statistics INEI February GDP grew only 0. 9%, the projections for employment in the coming months will be daunting. The International Labor Organization (ILO) argues that employment will decrease inevitably, because the occupancy rate is in decline since the early months of the year. So inevitably fall, during periods of recession because the economically active population is increasing and is more difficult for people to find work. A few months ago, the ILO undertook a project in two stages of unemployment to Lima in 2009. In the positive way, 42 thousand people would be dismissed and the negative 62 mil would be fired.
These projections were made at 5%, so the figures could rise. It is not expected that the GDP fell as much as recorded for February INEI. The growth of the workforce is 2. 5% per year and is possible to increase because of the recession. To absorb this sector would require a GDP of 4% if the Peru does not achieve this goal, it cannot meet the need of the work of this group and, hence, employment is reduced. Even less if Peru only can grow just 1%, as projected by some analysts. The real concern is the labor items is the under-employment. Then this figure will also increase.
The process of adjustment of labor markets in Peru is not the way open unemployment, if not of the underemployment. Many analysts are not giving attention in this area. Unemployment can vary a 1 percentage point, but the underemployment can increase by 7 points (a rate that is more significant) and this may worsen crisis. INEI reports that informal employment is at 45. 6% of the economically active population only in Lima. 5. 2 Expectations Recruitment The situation traced by analysts coincides with the “Quarterly survey of employment expectations 10/13 ationwide” of the national human resources consulting firm Manpower. For the second quarter, employers are reluctant to hire staff in all economic sectors. The sample, which can be seen in the table below shows that between April and June, 15% of employers planned to reduce staff. This figure is far from 6% in the previous semester; more when compared with the period last year (April-June 2008), where only 1% showed moderate to recruit employees. The global crisis has forced employers to rethink Peruvian projects and be more conservative about it.
This study shows that employers in two sectors: mining and construction and manufacturing, this sectors show pessimism to recruit new workers. This will indicate negative figures in the mining and construction (-2%) and manufacturing (5%). Expectation of Recruitment 2 quarter 2006 to 2nd quarter 2009 % nd 6. Forecast 6. 1 The economists make a projection about the grow and slowdown to the Peru? s economy one of this is the inflation, that it will be for the 2009 in 2. 2% 6. 2 It is estimated that exports would amount to U. S. $ 23,797 (millions) less than 24. 7% as recorded in 2008.
This decrease is explained by the decline of traditional exports (28. 5%) and non-traditional (13. 1%). The decrease of the first crash would basically to export mining products (26. 6%) and petroleum and its derivatives (47. 5%). However, the demand for gold as asset coverage is increasing. For its part, the magnitude of the fall in non-traditional exports was influenced mainly by the contraction in sales of textile products (17. 2%), agriculture (13. 7%) and iron and steel (34. 7%). 6. 3 For this year it is expected that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will grow 3. % in real terms over the previous year as a result of the performance of the components of domestic demand (4. 1%) both public and private. 11/13 6. 4 Peru hopes that in 2009, the imports will register a value of US$24, 451 millions, reducing in nominal terms 14% respect to 2008. This decline would be associated to lower fuel imports product from falling international oil prices and weakening domestic demand. The latter induced by the slowdown in private consumption and private investment, and non-primary production sectors, which demand less raw materials and capital goods.
However, it is not ruled out the possibility of slower growth in domestic demand brought about a greater contraction in imports. 6. 5 The base scenario considers that in the terms of trade, it will decrease 6% compared to 2008 as a result of the contraction of export prices (25. 1%) and falling prices of imports (19. 1%). 6. 6 Peru expected a deficit in the current account balance of U. S. $ 3,706 million (3. 3% of GDP), based on the gap in the trade balance deficit of $ 1,091 million and in the lower flow of income of remittances of workers abroad. 7. Recommendations From the results of studies, the Peru? Government should prioritize the sector that was most affected by the financial crisis, as we have seen in this paper, one of the sectors most affected were the exportations, because Peru is a producer of raw material, Currently the government is carrying out the economic stimulus plan, projected for 2010 through 2012, with which are also implementing a series of regulations to benefit certain sectors. Besides them the Ministry of Labor has begun a project to those workers, mainly from the mining sector, could be relocated to other companies as an alternative to this has been proposed to integrate the construction sector.
There is much to take at this stage that although the agreements signed with other countries, free trade agreements were created to stimulate trade between Peru and these countries, we now have more disadvantages than advantages as prices raw materials have decreased. 8. Conclusions This paper has been prepared to show which have been the consequences of the financial crisis on the economy of Peru, although it is true, some indicators suggest it has not been fully involved, the reality is that the outlook for growth that it was experienced has been greatly reduced, so that shows the projection of the estimated GDP for 2009, which would be 3. % while the year 2008 was 9. 8% among the highest in the world. In the opinion of the Bank of Finance (BIF) both Peru and Brazil are the first countries to show the first recovery? s indicators of the financial crisis. In Peru has seen this recovery because it is a country with an emerging economy, while the developed countries the financial crisis has had a greater impact. The Peru is currently in a stable macroeconomic situation, which has secured funding lines to face any contingency.
The Peruvian government has launched the Economic Stimulus Plan (ESP) that aims to generate 88 thousand direct jobs in construction, steel, wood, glass, among others, and other plans to create 215 thousand jobs. Also it plans to disburse between this year and 2010 US$4, 187 million dollars to develop the ESP, which provides face the international financial crisis. 12/13 9. References  HURTADO, ROSARIO. Menudo Empleo, Revista Ideele 2008 (Spanish version)  DONNER, ARTHUR and PETERS, DOUG, Money, Bank Capital and Zero Interest Rates, Behind the Numbers, Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives , 2009  BAKEWELL, PETER.
Silver and Entrepreneurship in Seventeenth- Century Potosi: The Life and Times of Antonio Lopez de Quiroga. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988.  FIGUEROA, ADOLFO. Capitalist Development and the Peasant Economy of Peru. Cambridge [Cambrigeshire]: Cambridge, University Press, 1984.  THORP, ROSEMARY, and GEOFFREY BERTRAM. Peru 1890-1977: Growth and Policy in an Open Economy. New York: Columbia, University Press, 1978.  REX A. HUDSON, ed. Peru: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1992. 7] MINISTERY OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMICS OF PERU, MARCO MACROECONOMICO MULTIANUAL 2010-2012 – PARA CONTINUAR CON EL CRECIMIENTO, EL EMPLEO Y LA INCLUSION SOCIAL  COMISION ECONOMICA PARA AMERICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE, CEPAL (2008). Panorama social para America Latina: 2008. Naciones Unidas. Santiago de Chile.  COMISION ECONOMICA PARA AMERICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE, CEPAL (2009). “La reaccion de los Gobiernos de America Latina y el Caribe frente a la crisis internacional: una presentacion sintetica de las medidas de politica anunciadas hasta el 31 de marzo del 2009”. Naciones Unidas, Santiago de Chile, pp. 57, Abril. 13/13